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NOTES
draw, more customer inconvenience is required to make the area un-
reasonable than if the employee's customer draw is only incidental.
ADMINISTRATIVE VERSUS JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP: SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF SECTION 360 OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACT
The concept of citizenship is fundamental in defining the relation-
ship between an individual and a sovereign state.' United States citizen-
ship is especially fundamental in that it has conferred more freedom upon
more individuals than any other in history. American citizens may wor-
ship God as they please, express their opinions freely and pursue any
lawful business or profession of their choice. They have the right to
be secure in their homes and in their possessions and they are protected
against arbitrary action by the state.2 In the words of Mr. Justice Black:
Not only is United States citizenship a 'high privilege,' it is a
priceless treasure. For that citizenship is enriched beyond
price by our goal of equal justice not for citizens alone, but for
all persons coming within the ambit of our power.'
A denial of citizenship, is therefore, a serious matter, and the Constitu-
tion requires that it not be arbitrary.'
Consequently, neither a state nor a federal agency may deprive a
person of citizenship or the rights of citizenship without a trial hearing
on that issue.' But the Constitution does not require a court trial in
all instances.' In some cases an administrative hearing may be an ac-
ceptable alternative.' Residency or lack of residency is the constitutional
1. VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES iv (1904).
2. The incidents of American citizenship are beyond the scope of this note but
see Holliman, Some Privileges and Duties of a Citizen, 30 OKLA. B.A.J. 1387 (1959)
for an enthusiastic consideration of this topic.
3. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950).
4. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920) ; Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8 (1908).
5. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S.
460 (1912) ; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) ; United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U.S. 253 (1905); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
6. Kvock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920); United States v. Ju Toy, 198
U.S. 253 (1905); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904); Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
7. Ibid.
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basis for this distinction! In United States v. Tu Toy9 the Supreme
Court held that a person "stopped at our borders" receives all that the
Constitution requires if he is given an opportunity to test his claim in
an administrative hearing.
Such a hearing satisfies the minimal constitutional requirement if
an, issue of citizenship is raised by a non resident. Congress, however,
can establish higher standards of trial formality by legislation. Section
360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is the present statutory
determinant of the type of trial to be accorded claims of citizenship.Y
Its conservative provisions adhere closely to the constitutional minimum.
Section 360 prescribes a judicial remedy for denials of citizenship which
occur within the United States and an administrative remedy for those
which occur outside of the United States and in exclusion proceedings.
The American Bar Association has recommended that section 360 be
amended to afford a judicial remedy to every claimant of United States
citizenship, whether within or without the United States." This recom-
mendation has been reflected in some of the conflicting interpretations
of that provision. The courts are not in agreement as to the effect of
section 360 and interpretations are developing which will render it
meaningless. The purpose of this note is to place that conflict in a
historical context and to analyze the reasons for the disagreement among
the courts.
The discussion begins historically with United States v. Ju Toy."
In that case, the Supreme Court decided that the Constitution required
no more than an administrative hearing if the issue of citizenship arose
in an exclusion proceeding. Ju Toy, a non resident, applied for admis-
sion at a port of entry and supported his petition by alleging American
citizenship. The immigration officials decided that he was not a citizen
and excluded him. Ju Toy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus but
failed to allege that the administrative hearing was unfair. The trial
court considered his claim de novo and reversed the administrative de-
termination. On appeal the Supreme Court reinstated the administrative
8. In United States v. .u Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905), the Supreme Court minimized
the rights of non residents by holding that a person excluded from the United States
is only entitled to an administrative hearing. In Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276(1922) the Court emphasized the significance of residency by holding that a person
within the United States could not be deported without a court trial on the issue of
citizenship.
9. 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 360, 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503
(1958).
11. 10 AMa. LAw BuLL. 10-11 (Fall, 1957).
12. 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
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decision, holding that the applicable immigration laws made administra-
tive determinations of citizenship conclusive on the courts. Since Ju Toy
had failed to allege an unfair hearing, there was no basis for a court
review of the agency action. Even if he had alleged an unfair hearing,
the reviewing court would have been limited to a consideration of that
issue and could not have decided his citizenship in an original action."3
In Nfg Fung Ho v. White4 the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween resident and non resident citizenship claimants. The Court held
that the Constitution would not permit a citizenship claimant to be de-
ported without a court trial on that issue. The decision emphasized the
significance of residency by reaffirming the Ju Toy holding that a non
resident citizenship claimant must be satisfied with an administrative
hearing.
The "fair hearing" required in an exclusion proceeding does not
necessarily mean compliance with the procedural formality of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. The provisions of the APA do not apply
to "the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by
or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated
pursuant to statute."" The special boards of inquiry employed in im-
migration proceedings are embraced within this exception.'" In 1950,
Congress expressly exempted exclusion proceedings from the adjudicative
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.' Although this
exemption was repealed in 1952 by the Immigration and Nationality
Act,'" exclusion proceedings are still execpted from the requirements of
the APA because of the specific statutory procedure for the conduct of
13. The scope of review in a habeas corpus proceeding is limited to a considera-
tion of the fairness of the agency action and whether the evidence adequately supports
the verdict. See cases cited in Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 934, 936 (6th Cir. 1930).
14. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
15. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(a)
(1958).
16. Wah v. Shaughnessy, 190 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1951); Frisch v. Miller, 181 F.2d
360 (5th Cir. 1950); Saclarides v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1950). In
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), the Supreme Court held that ad-
ministrative hearings in deportation cases must conform to the procedural requirements
of the APA. Immediately after this decision, representatives of the Department of
Justice informed the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives that
the Immigration Service would need close to four million dollars in additional appro-
priations to meet the expense of complying with the APA. Based upon this information,
the House Appropriations Committee recommended the enactment of a rider exempting
exclusion and deportation proceedings from the Administrative Procedure Act. 8 U.S.-
C.A. 48-50 (1952).
17. "Proceedings under law relating to exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall
hereafter be without regard to the provisions of Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act." Act of Sept. 27, 1950, Ch. III § 101, 64 Stat. 1048.
18. Immigration and Nationality Act § 403(a), 66 Stat. 280 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
155(a) (1958).
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such proceedings.19 The special statutory procedure is a substitute for
the comparable provisions of the APA.
An exclusion hearing conducted by a special inquiry officer will
satisfy the general requirements of fairness if it includes notice of the
charges against the applicant, the right to representation by counsel, an
opportunity for the claimant to confront and cross examine adverse
witnesses and a decision based upon an accurate record and supported
by substantial evidence.2" Regardless of these considerations, a hearing
before a special inquiry officer is not comparable to a hearing conducted
by an officer qualified under section 11 of the APA. As of 1952, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service had 119 full time hearing
officers. These officers had Civil Service classifications ranging from
GS-7 to GS-9. Only 26.8% had baccalaureate degrees and of this num-
ber only 4.3%o had law degrees. None of these examiners were practic-
ing attorneys before they became hearing officers.2 In 1955 the
Hoover Commission Task Force reported that: "These officers for
the most part are unqualified to perform legal or judicial functions."2 "
Prior to the enactment of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,
a non resident citizenship claimant had no right to a court trial but was
remitted to a hearing conducted by such special inquiry officers. In
1934, Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act2 which authorized
federal courts to issue declaratory judgments determining rights, obli-
gations and status whenever such issues became involved in a justiciable
controversy. In Perkins v. Elg24 the Supreme Court held that this Act
was applicable to controversies regarding citizenship. Six years later,
Congress enacted the Nationality Act which contained a special statutory
remedy for declarations of citizenship. Section 503 authorized federal
courts to entertain original actions to determine the facts of citizenship
whenever denied by administrative authority, whether within the United
States or abroad.25
The special remedy differed from the general declaratory judg-
ment action in two ways. First, section 503 permitted the action to be
brought either in the District of Columbia or in the district of the plain-
tiff's residence. The Declaratory Judgment Act required the action to
19. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
20. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920); Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8 (1908).
21. 2 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 5, § 10.02 (1958).
22. 1955 TAsi FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDuRE 273.
23. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1952), as amended; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (Supp. I, 1958).
24. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
25. Nationality Act of 1940 § 503, 54 Stat. 1137, 1171.
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be brought only in the district of the defendant's residence, ordinarily
the District of Columbia. Second, the remedy created by the Nationality
Act was implemented by a provision permitting a person outside the
United States to obtain a certificate of identity from a consular officer
of the United States. This certificate was designed to aid an aggrieved
person to travel to the United States in order to prosecute his claim of
citizenship. Because of the more advantageous provisions of the Na-
tionality Act, the special remedy of section 503 replaced the general
remedy for adjudications of citizenship.2"
The legislative history of the Nationality Act indicates that section
503 was intended to.be merely a remedy against arbitrary expatriation.27
It immediately followed the subchapter which created additional grounds
for expatriation and the congressional debates indicate that it, was in-
tended primarily to protect those who might run afoul of the expatriation
provisions." Apparently Congress was content to let fu Toy govern
denials of citizenship in exclusion proceedings.
But the introductory language of section 503 permitted "any person"
denied a right of citizenship to obtain a declaratory judgment. Literally,
this language was broad enough to include persons who had raised the
issue in an exclusion proceeding. The significance of this broad lan-
guage, however, was not immediately recognized." Only four exclusion
cases were reported under section 503 within the first five years after
its enactment." In one of the first exclusion cases brought under that
provision the court held that an administrative determination of citizen-
ship was conclusive on the courts." But it was eventually decided that
section 503 would justify a declaratory judgment of citizenship in
exclusion cases.
26. Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954).
27. See discussion in 86 CONG. REC. 13247-48 (1940).
28. "The Congressional proceedings, plus the place of Section 903 in the Na-
tionality Code, persuasively indicate that, in enacting that Section, the Congress never
contemplated that it should be availed of by persons who have never been in the United
States and against whom no charge of expatriation has been made." Ly Shew v. Ache-
son, 110 F. Supp. 50, 55 (N.D. CaL 1953).
29. Zimmerman, Judicial Versus Administrative Determination of Controverted
Claims to United States Citizenship, 43 GEo. LJ. 19, 46 (1954); Willis, The Right to
Judicial Review of an Administrative Finding on the Fact of Citizenship in Exclusion
Cases, 1950 Wis. L. IEv. 677, 682 (1950).
30. Haaland v. Attorney General, 42 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1941); Schaufus v.
Attorney General, 45 F. Supp. 61 (D.Mo. 1942); Brassert v. Biddle, 59.-F. Supp. 457
(D.Conn. 1944); Ginn v. Biddle, 60 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
31. United States ex rel. Medeiros v. Clark, 82 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
32. Gan Seouw Tung v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Yoshiro Shibata
v. Acheson, 86 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Meiji Fujizawa v. Acheson, 85 F. Supp.
674 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Ishikawa v. Acheson, 85 F. Supp. 1 (D, Hawaii 1949) ; Mah
Ying Og v. Clark, 81 F. Supp. 696 (D.D.C. 1948).
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Once aliens discovered the significance of that provision it did not
take them long to exploit its possibilities. In California, three cases
were filed under section 503 in 1949. The number of cases increased
to twenty-five in 1950 and to 161 in 1951."8 In 1952, the trend became
apparent and one California judge indicated the seriousness of the
problem:
Then came the deluge. By the close of business on December
24, 1952, there were on file in this District a total of 716 cases.
By the same date, 189 cases had been filed in the Southern Dis-
trict of California, a grand total of 905 cases in both Califor-
nia districts. As near as may be presently ascertained, a total
of 1,288 cases (including the California suits) have been com-
menced in the United States.34
The amount of litigation thrust upon the courts by the use of
section 503 in exclusion cases was not the only disadvantage of that
provision. The easy availability of certificates of indentity provided an
opportunity for aliens to enter the country fradulently. The certificates
not only made it easy for their holders to travel to a port of entry on
American vessels, but they also served as tickets of admission. Once
entry had been achieved, the aliens would disappear and never appear
in court to litigate their claims of citizenship.
In 1952, Congress repealed section 503 and substituted for it section
360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 5 That amendment was
33. Ly Shew v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 50, 54 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
34. Ibid.
35. "If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege as
a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any department
or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of
the United States, such person may institute an action under the provisions of section
2201 of Title 28 (Declaratory Judgment Act) against the head of such department or
independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States,
except that no such action may be instituted in any case if the issue of such person's
status as a national of the United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with
any exclusion proceeding under the provisions of this chapter or any other act or (2)
is in issue in any such exclusion proceeding... (b) If any person who is not within
the United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is
denied such right by any department . . . thereof, upon the ground that he is not a
national of the United States, such a person may make application to a diplomatic or
consular officer of the United States in the foreign country in which he is residing for
a certificate of identity for the purpose of traveling to a port of entry in the United
States and applying for admission. . . . The provisions of this subsection shall be
applicable only to a person who at some time prior to his application for the certificate
of identity has been physically present in the United States, or to a person under
sixteen years of age, who was born abroad of a United States citizen parent. (c) A
person who has been issued a certificate of identity under the provisions of subsection
(b) of this section, and while in possession thereof, may apply for admission to the
United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this
240
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intended to solve the problems caused by a liberal interpretation of sec-
tion 503. Section 360(a) limits the right to sue for a declaratory judg-
ment of citizenship to persons who are within the United States. It
also deprives the Federal Courts of jurisdiction to issue declaratory
judgments if the issue of citizenship arises or is involved in an exclusion
proceeding.
Subsections (b) and (c) are designed to provide an administrative
remedy for persons outside the United States who have no right to
relief in the federal courts. Subsection (b) directs such a person to
obtain a certificate of identity, enabling him to travel to a port of entry
and to apply for admission into the United States. Apparently, obtain-
ing a certificate of identity is part of the procedure for securing an ad-
ministrative adjudication of citizenship. 8
Subsection (c) requires the certificate holder to prosecute his claim
in an exclusion proceeding where, according to the Ju Toy decision, it
may be administratively determined. Thus, the direction to raise the
issue of citizenship in an exclusion proceeding is a provision for its
administrative adjudication.
If a certificate of identity is a condition precedent to obtaining
administrative relief, it is important to note that it is only available to
prior residents of the United States or to children under sixteen who
were born abroad of American parents. Section 360, as it has been
interpreted, has a limited class of beneficiaries because it is unavailable
to persons who cannot secure certificates of identity. 8
Because of its discriminatory nature, section 360 has not received
a uniform interpretation. The courts are divided as to its effect on the
rights of non residents to receive a trial hearing on the issue of citizen-
ship. Some courts have ignored constitutional implications and have
chapter relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to
the United States. A final determination by the Attorney General that any such person
is not entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review by any
court of competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise ... "
Immigration and Nationality Act § 360, 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958).
36. Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954); D'Argento v.
Dulles, 113 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1953); Avina v. Brownell, 112 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.
Tex. 1953).
37. "The provisions of this subsection shall be applicable only to a person who at
some time prior to his application for the certificate of identity has been physically
present in the United States, or to a person under sixteen years of age who was born
abroad of a United States citizen parent." Immigration and Nationality Act, § 360(b),
66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (1958).
38. Guerrieri v. Herter, 186 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1960); Tijerina v. Brownell,
141 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1956); Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709
(D.D.C. 1954); Avina v. Brownell, 112 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
interpreted section 360 as being exclusively determinative of the citizen-
ship issue." ,
In D'Argenta n. Dulles" a non resident petitioned for -6 declaratory
judgment to determine his citizenship subsequent to-receiving a notice of
expatriati6n. The Secretary of State obtained a dismissal on the ground
that section 360(a) deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain the
case. Since D'Argento's citizenship was not denied within the United
States, he lacked the requisite status to sue for a declaratory judgment.
Finding that D'Argento was eligible for a certificate. of identity, the
court directed him to pursue his administrative remedy, holding that
Congress intended for non residents to adjudicate their citizenship under
the limited procedure of section 360(b) and (c).
In Avina v. Brownell" the immigration authorities excluded a non
resident on the ground that he had forfeited his citizenship by leaving the
country to, evade the draft. Avina contested the exclusioh order and filed
for a declaratory judgment of his citizenship. The court granted the de-
fendant's motion for dismissal because Avina had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under section 360. The court suggested in dicta
that a person who has been unable to secure a certificate of identity
might not be able to bring any kind of action to establish his citizenship.
Ferretti v. Dulles42 is on the same point. The court in that case held,
as an additional ground for its decision, that the plaintiff could not ob-
tain a court review of her citizenship until she had exhausted her admin-
istrative remedies under section 360(b) and (c). Since she wias eligible
for a certificate of identity she was not entitled to a judicial consideration
of her claim until immigration officials had determined her citizenship
in an exclusion proceeding. Even then, the reviewing court could ,not
adjudicate her citizenship in an original trial. Administrative adjudica-
tions of citizenship under section 360 are reviewable by way of habeas
corpus "and not otherwise."4 Accordingly, the court would have been
limited to a review of the fairness of the agency action."
Sato v. Dulles" is in .accord with these decisions. In that case, the
39. Sato v. Dulles, 183 F. Supp. 307. (D. Hawaii 1958) ; Rosasco v. Brownell, 163
F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Moy Yee Mon v. Dulles, 161 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich.
1958); Matsuo v. -Dulles, 133 F. Supp. 711, 716 (S.D. Cal.'1955) ; Avina v. Brownell,
112 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. Tex. 1953) ; D'Argento v. Dulles, 113 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1953).
40. 113 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1953).
41. 112 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
42. 246 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1957).
43. Immigration and Nationality Act § 360(c), 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1503 (c) (1958).
44. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (.1923) ; Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S.-I8, 11 (1908) ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
45. 183 F. Supp. 307 (D. Hawaii 1958). i ,
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plaintiffs were American citizens by birth, but they were expatriated and
denied passports because they had voted in a Japanese election. Both
plaintiffs appealed the agency action and sued for a declaratory judg-
ment. The court dismissed their complaint, noting that their cause of
action was not preserved by the savings clause of the new legislation. So,
under section 360(a), the plaintiffs were precluded from obtaining a
declaratory judgment because they were not within the United States.
The court held that subsections (b) and (c) provided the sole remedy
for non resident citizenship claimants.
In view of the legislative history of section 360, these interpreta-
tions are a reasonable expression of congressional intent.46 Congress
amended section 503 of the Nationality Act to eliminate the abuses
which resulted from its administration. Congress intended not only to
regulate the procedure for obtaining certificates of identity but also to
substitute an administrative remedy for non residents.4 This was in-
tended to relieve the courts of excessive litigation resulting from the
liberal interpretations of the 1940 Act.
Other courts, however, have evaded the injunction of section 360(a)
by permitting actions for declaratory judgment in cases where the citi-
zenship claimant is ineligible for a certificate of identity.4 This line of
authority was initiated by Ton Mung Ngow v. Dulles49 in which a resi-
dent of China was denied a passport on the ground that he was not a
citizen. Ngow petitioned for a declaratory judgment, but the Secretary
of State defended on the theory that section 360 (a) deprived him of any
right to bring the action. The District Court denied the motion for dis-
missal and permitted Ngow to maintain the action. The court held that
section 360 is inapplicable to citizenship claimants who do not qualify
for certificates of identity under the terms of subsection (b). Accord-
46. "In spite of the definite restrictions on the use and application of § 503 to
bona fide cases, the subcommittee finds that the section has been subject to broad inter-
pretation, and that it has been used in a considerable number of cases to gain entry
into the United States where no such right existed. . . . The subcommittee therefore
recommends that the provisions of section 503 as set out in the proposed bill be modified
to limit the privilege to persons who are in the United States. . . ." S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong. 2d Sess., p. 777 (1950).
47. "The bill modifies section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 by limiting the
court action exclusively to persons who are within the United States. . . . The net
effect of this provision [section 360(b)] is to require that the determination of the
nationality of such person [one eligible for a certificate of identity] shall be made in
accordance with the normal immigration procedures. These procedures include review
by habeas corpus proceedings where the issue of the nationality status of the person
can be properly adjudicated." S. RP. No. 1137, 82d Cong. 2d Sess., p. 50 (1952).
48. Guerrieri v. Herter, 186 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1960) ; Tijerina v. Brownell,
141 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1956); Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709
(D.D.C. 1954).
49. 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954).
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ing to subsection (c), a certificate of identity is essential to administra-
tive relief. But such certificates are not available to persons like Tom
Mung Ngow, who have never resided in the United States and are over
sixteen years of age. Such persons do not qualify for any statutory
remedy. The court cited D'Argento v. Dulles" but distinguished it by
noting that the petitioner in that case was eligible for a certificate of
identity and could have received relief under section 360(b) and (c).
The District Court in Tijerina v. Brournell5 reached the same con-
clusion. That court permitted a person excluded from the United States
to sue for a declaratory judgment to establish his citizenship. Tijerina,
like Tom Mung Ngow, did not qualify for a certificate of identity. The
court held that section 360 (a) does not preclude the possibility of relief
by declaratory judgment in situations where that provision does not ap-
ply and where there is no available procedure to adjudicate the issue of
citizenship.
Although these decisions cannot be justified by statutory language
or legislative history, they express a justifiable exception to the provi-
sions of section 360. The courts have postponed a decision on constitu-
tional issues by affording a judicial remedy to persons who do not qualify
for a certificate of identity. The discriminatory scheme of section 360(b)
and (c) bars persons who cannot obtain a certificate of identity from
the administrative route, so a court trial is the only opportunity for such
persons to receive a trial hearing on the issue of their citizenship.
Congress cannot establish arbitrary classifications and distinguish
between the rights of persons similarly situated.52 Although the fifth
amendment does not contain an "equal protection" clause, discrimination
in a federal statute may be so arbitrary as to violate due process.58 The
standards of equality imposed against federal legislation, however, are
less restrictive than are those applied against the states.5 A complainant
against a federal statute must show that the classification is so grossly
discriminatory as to amount to a confiscation of his rights.5 The regu-
lation of certificates of identity has a valid purpose in that it was de-
signed to cure specific abuses in that procedure. The classification scheme
of section 360(b) may have a reasonable relationship to that purpose.
50. 113 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1953).
51. 141 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1956).
52. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
53. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377
(1921).
54. Bertelsen v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1954); Neild v. District of Co-
lumbia, 110 F.2d 246 (D.D.C. 1940).
55. Id.
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Nevertheless, persons who cannot qualify for certificates of identity are
deprived of their right to a trial hearing to the extent that the certificate
procedure is made a part of the remedy for securing adjudications of
citizenship.
The courts have reacted to this problem by permitting such persons
to litigate their citizenship by declaratory judgment. But this is not an
entirely adequate solution. The Tom Mung Ngow decision exempts from
the statute a part of the class which Congress intended to regulate. It
makes the discrimination cut the other way; persons ineligible for a cer-
tificate of identity have the advantage of a declaratory judgment while
certificate holders are remitted to an administrative remedy. This is a
serious discrimination because administrative hearings do not afford the
procedural safeguards of a court trial. A citizenship claimant in an ex-
clusion proceeding has the burden of proof on the issue of his admissi-
bility." The judicial rules of evidence are inapplicable to such hearings
and hearsay evidence may be received against the claimant.5 7  The pre-
sumption of legitimacy, one of the strongest in law, has no place in an
immigration proceeding. Finally, a special inquiry officer may rely on
uncertified foreign documents in reaching his determination, even though
the claimant has no opportunity for cross examination. 9 The Constitu-
tion requires a court trial in criminal cases, yet loss of citizenship can be
more serious than a fine or imprisonment. Thus, any interpretation of
section 360 which treats certificate holders less favorably than non holders
is subject to constitutional objections.
The only solutions are to give certificate holders the option of
declaratory judgment, since non holders can obtain such a remedy, or to
remit both classes to an administrative hearing. In Cort v. Herter"0 the
District Court for the District of Columbia selected the first solution and
permitted a person who could have obtained a certificate of identity to
sue for a declaratory judgment. In that case, a citizen by birth was de-
nied a passport on the ground that he had been expatriated for leaving
the country at the beginning of the war. He contested the administrative
ruling and sued for a declaratory judgment. The Secretary of State
moved for dismissal, contending that the petitioner had failed to pursue
section 360 procedure for obtaining a review of his citizenship. The
56. Loy v. Cahill, 81 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1936) ; ex parte Miyazono, 53 F.2d 172
(9th Cir. 1931).
57. Loy v. Cahill, 81 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1936); Smith v. Curran, 12 F.2d 636(2d Cir. 1926).
58. Matter of L.C.S., 6 I.&N. Dec. 212 (Bd. Immigration Appeals 1954).
59. Smith v. Curran, 12 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1926).
60. 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal docketed sub nom. Rusk v. Cort
(No. 567, 1960 Term; renjimbqred No. 20, 1961 Term), 30 V.... WFEK 3001 (1961).
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court denied the motion, holding that section 360 is not an exclusive
remedy for citizenship claimants. It merely provides an alternative rem-
edy and does not preclude a non resident from obtaining a declaratory
judgment if he avoids the certificate procedure for administrative relief."
This decision, like Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles,62 is not justified by
legislative history. Section 360 was not designed to provide an alterna-
tive remedy for denials of citizenship. It was intended to prevent court
adjudications of citizenship when" the issue arises outside the United
States or in an exclusion proceeding.63 The option afforded by the Cort
case destroys the effectiveness of section 360 because non residents will
not choose the administrative procedure of that provision when a declara-
tory'judg-ment can be so easily obtained. The Cort decision does settle
constitutional doubts, however, by rendering the discriminatory scheme
of section 360(b) and (c) completely harmless. If that decision is af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, 4" every claimant of United States citizen-
ship will be entitled to a judicial determination of his claim. Section 360
will have been amended by the judicial process to conform to the recom-
mendation made by the American Bar Association in 1957.5
TAXABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS PAID TO STOCK-
HOLDERS OF CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
The taxability of insurance proceeds paid upon policies covering
the lives of key persons and stockholders of closely-held corporations
presents an interesting and unique problem f6"r the tax planner. The
choice of similar programs niay lead to vastiy different tax consequences,
and careless planning may subject surviving stockholders to taxation
under the theory of constikuctive dividends. This problem is by no means
new for in 1925 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that:
Where the proceeds of a life insurance policy are paid to a cor-
61. "While the plaintiff might have applied for a certificate of identity for the pur-
pose of following the procedure set forth in Section 360, there is nothing in this case
to indicate that he ever did or that such a certificate has been issued to him. Instead
he has chosen to bring this action under the Declaratory judgment Act for a judgment
declaring him to be a United States citizen." Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683, 685
(D.D.C, 1960). (Emphasis added.)
62. 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954).
63. Legislative history cited notes 46, 47 supra.
64. °This case was argued October 11, 1961 but the decision is still pending. 30
U.SJL. WEEiK 3134 (1961).
657 CJ. text accompanying note 11 npra.
